Introduction
Cyberattacks on the food and beverage (F&B) manufacturing sector have surged, mirroring trends seen across industrial control systems (ICS) and critical infrastructure. In recent years, F&B processors around the world have faced an array of cyber threats – from ransomware crippling production lines to hackers breaching industrial controls in ways that could threaten consumer safety. These incidents not only disrupt operations and cause financial losses, but can also ripple through supply chains, leading to product shortages or quality degradation.
It’s clear that F&B manufacturers, often running 24/7 operations on legacy technology, have become prime targets for cybercriminals. In the sections below, we examine notable real-world incidents since 2019 and evaluate the technological countermeasures that are either already in use or that have been proposed to defend against such threats.
Rising Threat Landscape for Food & Beverage Manufacturing
Threat actors recognize that many F&B manufacturers cannot tolerate downtime – making them more likely to pay ransoms – and that larger businesses may have deeper pockets while smaller ones may have weaker defenses.
A 2021 FBI alert warned that both large producers and smaller processors were being targeted, noting that common attack vectors include phishing emails, exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports, and exploitation of software vulnerabilities.
Notably, attackers have begun broadening their focus from just IT systems to also target operational technology (OT) assets, which can halt physical operations even when malware originates on the IT side.
The number of ICS vulnerabilities reported has also climbed sharply. Many of these flaws are in industrial software and hardware used across sectors, including food processing plants. Unpatched legacy systems, flat networks without proper segmentation, and increased connectivity between factory floors and corporate or vendor networks have expanded the attack surface – weaknesses that attackers can exploit to move from IT into plant controls. This confluence of vulnerable legacy technology and higher connectivity has set the stage for the recent surge in attacks on F&B manufacturing assets.
Notable Cyber Incidents in Food & Beverage Manufacturing (2024)
Dozens of cyber incidents affecting F&B companies have been publicly reported in recent years, ranging from ransomware locking up brewing systems to hackers disrupting the operations. Below we highlight several high-profile case studies that illustrate the range of threats and impacts in this sector:
Incident (Year) | Impact on Operations / Safety | Notes (Response or Exploited Vulnerability) |
Arizona Beverages (2019) | Hundreds of computers wiped; sales and production shut down for days (source) |
• FBI warned of malware prior; system was likely accessed via a phishing email • No cost disclosed |
Campari Group (2020) | Corporate servers encrypted; business operations disrupted (liquor production affected globally) (source) |
• $15M ransom demanded • Hackers published Facebook ads to pressure Campari • Company PR acknowledged attack; payment not confirmed |
JBS Foods (2021) | 5 U.S. meat plants (20% of national capacity) shut down for 3 days – slaughter operations halted, causing fears of meat shortages and price spikes (source) |
• $11M ransom paid to REvil group • Attack started in IT; plants were proactively taken offline to protect OT • U.S. attributed it to Russia-based actors |
Molson Coors (2021) | Brewery operations and shipments halted for several days, delaying beer production in US, Canada, and the UK (source) |
• Incident response and data recovery cost about $2M in Q1 2021 • Likely ransomware (not publicly confirmed) • Systems gradually restored from backups |
Schreiber Foods (2021) | All dairy plants and warehouses were taken offline ~5 days, stopping production & milk shipments and contributing to a nationwide cream cheese shortage (source) |
• $2.5M ransom demanded by attackers • Engaged response team to rebuild systems • Did not disclose if ransom was paid |
Ferrara Candy (2021) | Candy production disrupted ~2 weeks in October; partial plant shutdowns during the Halloween season (source) |
• Ransomware encrypted systems • Ransom payment not revealed (company declined to comment on it) |
KP Snacks (UK) (2022) | IT systems crippled; deliveries to supermarkets delayed/canceled for weeks, causing snack shortages (source) |
• Conti ransomware attack; data stolen (employee and financial records) • Partners warned supply may be impacted until end of March 2022 • Refused ransom demand • Extensive recovery efforts; cost at least $23 M in losses and IT restoration • Plans to bolster cybersecurity after incident |
Maple Leaf Foods (2022) | System outage across operations; plants had to run in manual mode (avoided mass shutdown, but normal business was interrupted) (source) |
• Refused ransom demand • Extensive recovery efforts; cost at least $23 M in losses and IT restoration • Plans to bolster cybersecurity after incident |
Dole Food Co. (2023) | North America production plants shut down temporarily; shipments halted, leading to a salad kit shortage in stores (source) |
• Ransomware confirmed. Dole contained attack quickly with third-party experts • Claimed “limited” impact, though distribution was visibly affected • Working with law enforcement |
Duvel Moortgat (2024) | A ransomware attack caused the brewery to shut down four Belgian plants and a US facility; operations resumed within days (source) |
• The company refused to pay the ransom • Criminals released a terabyte of sensitive data |
As shown above, ransomware has been the dominant threat, often forcing multi-day production outages. In several cases (JBS, Schreiber, KP Snacks, Dole), the cyberattack’s impact extended beyond the company to disrupt broader supply chains – either by creating shortages of consumer products or by halting upstream operations (e.g. slaughterhouses, dairy supply) with cascading effects. Some firms opted to pay hefty ransoms to expedite recovery (e.g. JBS), while others refused (Maple Leaf) and had to absorb significant recovery costs. Notably, even companies that maintained some production through manual processes still suffered sizeable financial losses, proving that cyberattacks carry both operational and economic consequences in this sector.
Breaches and Safety Incidents Targeting OT/ICS
While financially motivated ransomware has been the most common threat, there have also been incidents highlighting the risk of OT-specific breaches that could impact product safety or physical processes. An alarming example is an incident that occurred in Oldsmar, Florida (Feb 2021) – a remote access attack on a small city water treatment plant (part of the potable water supply chain) was launched in an attempt to modify the chemical mix. The sodium hydroxide level was changed from 100 ppm to 11,100 ppm – a massively unsafe dosage – in the water control system. Fortunately, an alert plant operator immediately noticed the cursor moving on his screen and reversed the change in real time. Later investigations suggested that it might not be a hacker-oriented attack, but the public was never in danger due to the quick intervention and additional chemical safety alarms in place. Even an unsupervised mis-operation can lead to serious safety/security impacts.
SCADA systems, widely used in the F&B sector to offer automated and continuous production services, are key for managing critical infrastructure but face daunting cybersecurity challenges. One major issue is their legacy, built decades ago without security in mind. These old systems lack modern security tools like encryption and authentication. This leaves them open to threats like hacking, viruses, worms, and denial-of-service attacks.
The blending of IT and OT systems in SCADA is also making it more challenging in terms of cybersecurity. This blending adds more possible angles for cyberattacks, putting SCADA systems at greater risk. Unfortunately, IT security tools don’t work well in OT environments because of their unique needs. This makes it harder to protect SCADA systems. More SCADA systems are built on top of Windows in the form of a PC, inheriting the same level of attack surface that all Windows-based devices bear, but with limited to zero security countermeasures to mitigate the risk. Meanwhile, with the convergence between IT and OT, ICS-targeted attacks against OT sectors are increasing, and the F&B sector is no exception.
Technological Countermeasures and Defense Measures
Addressing cyber threats in F&B manufacturing requires a multi-layered approach, combining people, processes, and technology. Below, we focus on realistic and applicable technological countermeasures currently in use or that have been proposed to protect manufacturing assets, especially industrial control systems. Key tools and solutions include network segmentation, secure remote access, industrial firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and endpoint anti-malware protection, among others. It’s important to note that no single solution is a silver bullet – effective defense involves defense-in-depth, where multiple controls work in concert to reduce risk.
Network Segmentation
Network segmentation is consistently cited as one of the most critical strategies for securing industrial environments. The idea is to break up the network into zones so that even if an attacker breaches one zone, they cannot easily spread to others.
In the food & beverage industry, many legacy OT systems were historically isolated (air-gapped), but today most of them are operated on top of network services, and some even have some form of external connectivity to the Internet.
Segmentation compensates for this by ensuring that a foothold in the IT network (through a phishing email or infected office computer) does not immediately grant access to critical control systems.
Secure Remote Access and Access Control
Remote access into industrial environments is a double-edged sword: it’s often necessary for vendors or engineers to use while providing support to systems, yet it can provide an entry point for attackers if not secured. Many manufacturing sites, including food plants, still use basic remote desktop tools or VPN connections that may lack strong authentication or granular controls. Also, these remote access tools are prime targets for hackers due to their established user base. Any revealed vulnerability can be quickly exploited, making regular updates to systems and remote access tools essential for keeping up with the latest security patches.
Companies are all encouraged to implement secure remote access solutions specifically tailored for OT. These include jump hosts or remote access gateways that act as controlled chokepoints – instead of directly exposing an ICS workstation to the internet, a remote user must be authenticated through a secure portal (often with multi-factor authentication), which then allows time-limited, monitored access to the ICS network. Modern OT remote access systems can integrate user authentication, authorization (ensuring the person can only access the specific system they need), and audit logs or even video recording of sessions for after-the-fact review.
At minimum, strong authentication (2FA/MFA) is now considered essential for any remote access to industrial networks.
Industrial Firewalls and OT Network Security (IDS/IPS)
Traditional IT firewalls and intrusion prevention systems are often insufficient for ICS environments, where specialized protocols (Modbus, PROFINET, EtherNet/IP, etc.) are used. Industrial firewalls are purpose-built to understand these protocols and enforce rules specific to ICS communications. For example, an industrial firewall might allow an HMI (human-machine interface) to read data from a PLC but block that same HMI from sending control commands to the PLC if it normally shouldn’t – effectively whitelisting ICS traffic patterns. They can also block known malicious signatures or abnormal packet structures on OT protocols. In many F&B plants, adding industrial firewalls at key junctions (like between the process control network and the corporate network, or between different process zones) greatly reduces the likelihood of an attacker’s malware reaching critical controllers.
Network segmentation, as discussed earlier, is usually enforced with these firewalls and associated switches. But beyond simple segmentation, deep-packet inspection (DPI) capabilities of industrial firewalls allow more granular filtering. For instance, one could configure a rule to block any command that writes to a PLC logic memory during production hours, since operators typically don’t download new control logic except during maintenance windows. This kind of rule could literally stop an attack like Stuxnet or a rogue insider from altering a controller, while still allowing normal sensor readings and status queries through. Many modern industrial firewalls or OT intrusion prevention devices come with libraries of known ICS protocol exploits and can automatically block suspicious patterns (like a malformed packet known to exploit a PLC vulnerability).
In short, OT network security appliances provide an essential layer of protection, implementing network-level policies tailored to ICS. When properly tuned, they not only enforce segmentation but can also detect or outright block illicit attempts to access controllers or send dangerous commands. With proper configurations, operational errors can be effectively mitigated through the network layer as well.
Industrial Anti-Malware Endpoints
Anti-malware endpoints strengthen OT cybersecurity in the F&B sector by protecting legacy systems, minimizing downtime, and supporting regulatory compliance. They detect and neutralize threats like ransomware without disrupting sensitive industrial processes, ensuring production lines stay operational and safe. With the rise of IT/OT convergence, these tools also prevent threats from spreading across networks, securing both internal operations and supply chain connections. Designed specifically for industrial environments, anti-malware solutions offer real-time protection that aligns with the unique demands of F&B manufacturing.
There are cases where traditional anti-malware solutions fall short in OT. Major predicaments include legacy system support, dependence on cloud services, and resource consumption that might impact operational efficiency. Finding a proper endpoint security solution optimized for OT is a critical point to start with. There are also cases where third-party software installations are totally prohibited due to the service terms set forth by equipment suppliers. One workaround that could be used is a self-contained security inspection tool that does not require software installation.
Backup, Recovery, and Incident Response Preparedness
Finally, a cornerstone of cyber defense (often undervalued until disaster strikes) is having robust backup and recovery capabilities, along with well-practiced incident response (IR) plans specific to industrial operations. Given the prevalence of ransomware, maintaining regular backups of critical systems and data – and storing them offline (air-gapped) – is absolutely essential.
Many organizations in this sector learned this the hard way: those with recent offline backups were able to recover without paying ransom, while those without backups had no choice but to negotiate or face prolonged downtime. The FBI explicitly urges food and agriculture companies to regularly backup data offline and secure those backups with passwords.
For manufacturing, this includes backing up not just IT data, but also ICS configurations: PLC programs, HMI projects, batch recipes, etc. If ransomware or a wiper malware hits a plant, the ability to re-image machines and quickly reload PLC code from backups can dramatically shorten the duration of the outage. For example, companies like Molson Coors and Maple Leaf Foods, which had backups and recovery plans, were able to rebuild systems and did not remain offline indefinitely (though it still took days/weeks).
In addition to backups, developing and testing incident response plans for ICS environments is a best practice. Traditional IT incident response may not address questions like: “If our sugar mixing control system is ransomware-encrypted, can we run the process manually, and how do we ensure safety during that?” or “Who has the authority to shut down production if we detect a cyber intrusion in the oven control network?”, but tabletop exercises and simulations can help answer these.
Part of this preparedness is ensuring that both OT and IT personnel are involved – an attack on a food plant will require a coordinated response between control engineers, plant managers, IT security, and possibly quality assurance and corporate communications.
To summarize, being prepared to respond and recover is as important as trying to prevent attacks. F&B manufacturers are increasingly adopting the mantra that cyber resilience (the ability to bounce back) is key. By backing up critical systems, practicing emergency procedures, and learning from each incident, organizations can limit the damage caused by even a successful breach.
Conclusion
The cases we have shared should serve as a wake-up call for cybersecurity in the global F&B sector. We have seen that ransomware attacks on manufacturers can halt production of everything from beer to beef, and even brief disruptions can echo through supply chains to consumers. We have also seen that the stakes go beyond the financial; incidents such as water treatment hacks show the potential for attackers to threaten public health by tampering with industrial controls. In response, the industry is moving from awareness to action: investing in stronger defenses such as segmented networks, specialized OT security tools, and robust incident response plans.
No defense is foolproof, especially as adversaries continue to evolve (for instance, the emergence of cross-industry ICS malware frameworks like PIPEDREAM in 2022). However, by implementing the countermeasures discussed, F&B manufacturers can significantly reduce their risk. These measures, combined with employee training and information sharing across the industry, form a pragmatic roadmap to protect the production lines that feed and refresh the world.
Cyber threats will likely remain a persistent challenge for the F&B sector, but with vigilance and the right investments, companies can continue their digital transformation securely. In doing so, they protect not only their bottom line, but also the continuity and safety of the food supply – a mission of critical importance to society.